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Institutional and electoral reforms have changed the way in which Congress 
works and the electorate votes.  Institutional changes include the polarization of parties 
and the use of restrictive rules to pass legislation.  Electoral reforms include primary 
reform and the institution of the invisible primary.  Schattschneider (1975) suggested that 
the scope of conflict be expanded to include the public more fully. Using the Affordable 
Care Act as a case study, institutional reform has complicated the legislative process and 
clouded the public’s view. Electoral reforms have not allowed the public increased 
control over legislation or election outcomes. From restrictive rules and interwoven 
connections to the invisible primary, elites retain control in the post-reform era. Parties 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 This thesis is looking at changes in Congress and the electorate to determine who 
controls political parties.  Institutional changes include the polarization of parties and the 
use of restrictive rules to pass legislation.  Electoral reforms include primary reform and 
the institution of the invisible primary.  Using the Affordable Care Act as a case study, 
institutional reform has complicated the legislative process and clouded the public’s 
view. Electoral reforms have not allowed the public increased control over legislation or 
election outcomes. From restrictive rules and interwoven connections to the invisible 
primary, elites retain control in the post-reform era. Parties are strong and clearly distinct, 
yet special interests dominate party behavior. 
Schattschneider (1975) suggested that the scope of conflict be expanded to more 
fully include the public.  Schattschneider’s critique of the system was that parties kept 
conflict private, meaning parties were controlled by special interests.  The way to 
publicize conflict and overcome special interests is to have responsible parties.  
Responsible parties would allow the public to exert its influence.  Schattschneider (1975) 
envisioned a party system in which parties were responsible to the electorate, instead of 
special interests.  This party system has not come to fruition in the United States.  
Institutional reforms have changed how Congress is run, which impacts the voters and the 
American public.  Electoral reforms have changed how the public attempts to wield 
power.  There has been much literature on how Congress works as well as where and 
when changes have occurred.  The public, the voters do not have enough control over the 
outcomes in Congress even though the public oftentimes appears to have more control 




dominated by special interests.  For parties to include the electorate by publicizing 
conflict should allow the voters increased control in the outcome of elections.  The 
question is: have these reforms worked? If reforms have worked then conflict is more 
public.  If reforms have had no effect, or even backfired, then conflict is still in the realm 
of private, special interests.  Over time, reforms have changed the ways in which voters 
interact with parties.  This thesis will examine this question by looking at changes in 
Congress and changes in election.  The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will serve as my case 
study.    
 The party system is structured in a manner which causes parties to attempt to win 
a plurality in order to win an election.  In this system, the electorate becomes confused or 
uncertain of where to assign blame because no party has total control—there is always a 
majority and a minority instead of one party being voted to have total control of the 
government.  The American Political Science Association, along with Schattschneider, 
outlined in 1950 the Responsible Parties Thesis (RPT).  In the RPT, the electorate would 
vote for a party, not a candidate.  Whichever party won would receive total control of all 
branches of government (Ranney, 1951).  Instead, the electorate now votes for 
candidates, leaving government with divided control.  With two parties constantly in 
government, the burden of responsibility is unclear.  Interest groups have a much clearer 
incentive to follow politics and are able to hold government officials accountable.  
Therefore, parties use the special interests of intense policy demanders to form the 
foundation of the party structure.  It is through the intense policy demands of special 
interests that the parties attempt to win a plurality of the vote of the electorate by 




means that the electorate is not truly influential in the decision-making process within the 
party.  Although reforms have occurred, the parties are still controlled by the special 
interests of intense policy demanders and the electorate is left without a clear place to lay 
blame. Party insiders and intense policy demanders have consistently weaved the way to 
power despite the various reforms that have occurred over time. 
 Schattschneider (1975) is often quoted saying—“Government is unthinkable save 
parties.”  This quote is referenced by some of the most notable names in American 
politics.  Scholarly research on parties almost invariable cites this quote.  Some ask how 
parties are organized, some ask what parties do, and some ask where party power is in 
Congress.  Parties have been a central part of government in the U.S. for many decades.  
This has led to many different theories of who parties are and the functions they serve.  
Most of the previous literature is focused on the organization in Congress.  There have 
been reforms through the years to try to make conflict about public interests instead of 
special interests.  Over the years there have been multiple reforms seeking to publicize 
the conflict in the American system.  Schattschneider advocated for publicizing the 
conflict through parties, by which he meant that the greatest number of people should be 
involved.   
History of Reforms 
 Interest groups controlling parties is what Schattschneider (1975) was trying to 
get away from by publicizing the scope of the conflict.  People who do not participate in 
politics are not always indifferent or ignorant—they do not participate because there is 
not an avenue for their opinions or needs.  Schattschneider (1975) argues that these non-




alignment was so sharply sectional that the bulk of American voters lived in one-party 
areas where they had little incentive to vote because they had no choice” (p. 108).  Some 
areas are still very distinctly sectional, with little (or no) option, leaving voters no 
incentive to participate.  If the conflict became more public, voters would have an 
incentive to participate.  As long as interest groups are controlling the parties, the scope 
of conflict will be narrowly tailored to special interest groups.  Schattschneider wants 
party politics to serve as an alternative to special interest politics. 
In the history of Congressional organization, one of the most powerful sources of 
influence was committee power.  The committees ran Congress and chairs ran 
committees.  This gave smaller groups and individuals more power.  Seniority and party 
loyalty have been major deciding factors in how committee chairs were appointed at 
various points in Congressional history.  It was rare that a freshman member would be 
able to greatly influence the setup or progress within a committee.  Newer members did 
not have experience and had not had time to sufficiently prove their loyalty to their party 
through methods such as voting record and support of legislation.  During this time of 
strong committees, Congress was seen as a static, unchanging institution.  This became 
the foundation upon which some scholars based their critiques.  The basic composition of 
Congress and its duties has not changed over time—it still consists of a bicameral 
legislature, even though there are now more Congressmen than at its inception.  
However, the ways in which members work within the two chambers has changed over 
time.   
Committees were originally thought to hold the most significant power. One 




Weingast, 1987).  This sounds ominous but really just means the committee dissuades 
anyone from opposing them, instead of encouraging openness or debate.  A committee 
using power negatively sometimes means a bill is less likely to be stalled on the floor if 
legislators work out deals beforehand and are not encouraged to change the policy after it 
reaches the floor.  Committees and their chairs used several methods for enforcing their 
power: “(1) punishment; (2) ex-ante defensive behavior; (3) ex-post defensive behavior” 
(Shepsle & Weingast, 1987, p. 88).  These powers are used to reinforce the special 
interests within parties and Congress.  
 Another characterization of Congress is based around party power.  Power in 
Congress flowed from the committee-based to party-based in the late 1900s.  Krehbiel 
(1993) asserted that parties served the purpose of passing legislation different from what 
a no-party Congress would pass, but parties were not exceptionally necessary.  He 
defines significant party behavior as “behavior that is consistent with known party policy 
objectives, but that is contrary to personal preferences” (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 240).  What 
this basically means is that parties would be more significant if legislators vote in a 
partisan manner that did not conflict with personal beliefs.  Oftentimes a legislator would 
vote against party affiliation if their personal beliefs were not in line with the party.  
When a legislator falls in line with the party in spite of personal beliefs, the party holds a 
strong influence over legislators in Congress. 
 Looking at Congress over time, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find that parties, not 
committees have had the most power in Congress.  Their findings stand in contrast to 
scholars like Krehbiel (1993) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987).  Krehbiel in particular 




an individual or committee level, and based on actual people, even in the committee.  The 
view of parties with power, Cox and McCubbins’ view, is about the group as a whole and 
the overarching structure of foundational sameness.  When parties are homogenous their 
power is greater than when they are heterogeneous.  A party is homogenous when most 
members share interests and opinions. Parties can wield power through individuals or 
committees based on the number of party legislators and the strength of the party.   
 Aldrich (1995) goes further in his seminal work entitled Why Parties? to discuss 
the benefits and extent of party power.  Parties exist to resolve the problems within the 
system and help government work more efficiently for office-seekers and office-holders.  
The first problem parties help overcome is collective action.  Parties are able to 
efficiently mobilize the electorate around a common goal: electing the party’s candidate.  
Strong parties provide a common place for voters to rally in support of common ideals 
and values in the form of a candidate.  Strong parties determine around which candidate 
the electorate will rally.  The second problem they help overcome is ambition.  Without 
parties, as many candidates could run as chose to, but parties only support one candidate 
in each general election.  This is an intraparty problem.  Ambition can lead to splitting the 
party, which would be bad for its overall image.  The third problem parties help 
overcome is cycling coalitions.  Without the organized party structure, candidates and 
office-holders may not know with whom to align or attempt to cooperate.  Parties 
establish settled groups of people who can cooperate in election after election, providing 
stability in the system.  This is an interparty problem.  Groups inevitably have to work 
with each other, and it is far easier to have a long-established group of groups to work 




According to Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008), “Party formation…is 
primarily an activity by which intense policy demanders pursue policy goals and 
secondarily an activity by which professional politicians achieve careerist and electoral 
goals” (emphasis added) (p. 79).  Aldrich (1995) ranks these in opposite order, putting 
individuals’ careerist goals first, followed by the demands of special interest groups.  
These are two competing views of party organization which contribute to the conflicting 
views of internal control of parties within the system. Parties are first formed by groups 
in order to get certain policies implemented.  It is only a secondary consideration that 
forming a party allows individuals to serve lengthy terms in office.  This is fundamental 
to understanding the American party system.  Cohen et al. trace the founding of parties 
back to the country’s Founders.  They themselves were intense policy demanders who 
acted like parties, regardless of the fact they urged against party (or faction) formation.  
Parties have always been comprised of intense policy demanders. 
 Bawn et al. (2008) and Cohen et al. (2012) tell a story that stands slightly in 
contrast to Aldrich (1995), yet they use the same foundation: Schattschneider.  Bawn et 
al. start their article by quoting Schattschneider (1975) in saying, “Democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of parties” (p. 571).  According to Bawn et al. (and Cohen et 
al.), interest groups and activists are the central players of parties and control the effects 
of party decision making.  Coalitions of interest groups and activists form for the purpose 
of joining efforts to ensure that each group gets what it wants, whereas for Aldrich parties 
were a coalition for the promotion of a candidate.  For Aldrich, parties were for the 
purpose of office-seekers and office-holders; For Bawn et al. and Cohen et al, parties are 




of interest groups is a way to prevent cycling coalitions.  According to Bawn et al. 
(2008), “The long coalition strives to nominate a candidate whom each group trusts to 
represent its interests in a manner acceptable to the coalition as a whole” (p. 575).  
Cooperation among groups is the most efficient way for each interest group to benefit.  
Coalitions do not have much power on the front end to bind candidates to their wishes, 
but candidates also know they risk losing electoral support and financial backing if they 
ignore the coalition once in office.  There is always a trade-off of groups trusting each 
other to combine interests and coalitions trusting candidates to promote combined 
interests.   
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2010) line up well with Bawn et al. (2012) in their 
view that Schattschneider’s (1975) goals have been attempted, but it is an illusion that 
conflict has become more public than private.  Although this is true, both sets of authors 
see that special interests (or extremists) are still very much in control of the running of 
government.  Fiorina’s assessment shows that the electorate hold opinions that are close 
to each other.  The influence of special interests pushes candidates into more extreme 
positions, which forces voters to elect more extreme candidates than the voters 
themselves probably would align with.  This is the essential struggle of American 
politics—even after the scope of conflict has been publicized special interests are still 
dominant in the political arena.  Elites and activists are polarized, but the general public 
is not.   
  Pluralism is the view that politics and decision making are located mostly in the 
framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their resources to 




demanders insert themselves into the election process and then exert their influence over 
the outcome.  The central question for classical pluralism is how power and influence are 
distributed in a political process.  Schickler (2001) identifies the question of pluralism 
within American politics.  Multiple groups attempt to assert their influence over the 
electorate.  This becomes disjointed due to the complications and tensions that arise 
between various groups when they each attempt to influence an election in their favor 
(Schickler, 2001).  Schickler says pluralism becomes disjointed because of the dynamics 
between interactions and tensions that exist among competing coalitions.  The exertion of 
influence by various groups creates tension within the legislature and causes coalitions to 
compete with one another instead of seeking cooperation. 
 Instead of opening up avenues for the public, parties have remained dominated by 
special interest groups.  These groups find a way to work through the system and make 
their voice heard over the rest of the electorate.  Cohen et al. (2008) refer to special 
interest groups as “intense policy demanders” who have particular interests which they 
pursue above anything else.  Intense policy demanders are: (1) animated by a demand/set 
of demands; (2) politically active on behalf of these demands; and (3) numerous enough 
to be influential (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 80).  Groups join together because it is more 
efficient than each group operating on its own.  By bringing together groups into one 
party, groups can compromise and find one candidate who represents most (or all) of the 
interests within the party.  By nominating and promoting only one candidate, each group 
is more likely to achieve its goals. 
 Party shifts have been essentially about policy demanders changing or new issues 




party around Andrew Jackson, he did so by appealing to the policy interests of those in 
the electorate.  Van Buren used the reputation of Jackson to rally broad based support in 
the election, Van Buren knew that Jackson could win the election by appealing to the 
broad interests of policy demanders.  Also, the anti-slavery movement was a major factor 
in the formation of the new Republican Party.  Supporters came from various existing 
parties for the overwhelming policy interest of ending slavery.  Van Buren rallied support 
of particular interests to boost Jackson’s run at the Presidency.  These were two major 
changes in the party system, both of which occurred due to intense policy demanders 
pursuing their interests through parties. 
 When intense policy demanders come together under one party, they are forced to 
make compromises.  While policy is the foremost concern of these groups, their policy 
demands will go nowhere without winning elections.  This leads groups of policy 
demanders to make compromises within the party.  The two compromises are: (1) among 
conflicting policies and priorities of groups inside the party; and (2) between preferences 
of the party groups and the voters.  However, sometimes it is impossible for a party to 
find a candidate that suits all groups (e.g., The Republicans in 2008 and 2012).  A party is 
strong when it unifies around one strong candidate which represents the interests of 
policy demanders within the party.  When a party is winning they are more likely to 
nominate a candidate who is more ideologically radical; when a party is losing they are 
more likely to nominate a candidate who appeals more to the interests of the public.  A 
party is strongest when it’s ideologically-driven candidate, supported by a particular 




group) also lines up with the interests of the voters.  Then special interest groups are 
assured electoral support while also being uninhibited in their policy demands. 
 One oft-discussed situation of party insiders who failed to catch the appeal of the 
public is Hubert Humphrey’s nomination in 1968.  Humphrey won the nomination by 
appealing to party insiders, and the insiders controlled the delegates.  Humphrey never 
ran in a primary, meaning the voters were never exposed to him as a candidate.  The 
party during this time was not actually weak—it was strong enough to overcome what the 
voters wanted and nominate a candidate the voters had not chosen.  Ultimately this was 
not a success as Humphrey lost the race for Presidency, but the loss was not due to a 
weak party.  The case of Humphrey’s nomination also spurred electoral change.  This 
electoral change came in the form of voters electing delegates and the candidate having to 
win support in many states during primary elections to win nomination.  While this may 
seem like a success in the electorate controlling the outcome, the power of the party has 
only shifted to another frame. 
 The new frame of party control occurs in attempts to lead the electorate during the 
primary season.  There has now been the implementation of direct primaries for the 
nomination of the candidates.  The direct primary is where the electorate is supposed to 
be able to cast their votes, and the candidate with the most votes wins the nomination.  
However, the implementation of the direct primary has led to the invisible primary.  The 
invisible primary now holds the power that national conventions once held—this is where 
party insiders exert their influence over the electorate for the benefit of the candidate they 
wish to nominate.  Before the institution of direct primaries, national conventions were a 




insiders coordinate to throw early support behind the candidate who best fits the needs of 
policy demanders within the party.  Without party insider support, a candidate cannot win 
the nomination and insiders will not support a candidate simply because he or she is 
ahead in primary polls.  According to Cohen et al. (2008), the invisible primary sets the 
agenda for voters.  Voters take cues from the party insiders and what most affects the 
results is “endorsements by party officials as reported by the media, cash-on-hand at the 
start of balloting, and Gallup standing at the end of the invisible primary” (Cohen et al., 
2008, p. 279).  Endorsements impact voters more than any other action, which means that 
party insiders (not candidates or voters) decide nominations.  
This shift in frame is what leads to the illusion that the electorate has control of 
the outcome of election.  When Humphrey won the nomination, it caused the electorate to 
attempt to regain control of the power to control the outcome of nomination and election.  
It was after Humphrey’s nomination that the electorate gained the power to directly 
nominate the candidates for general election.  This has led to the invisible primary.  The 
invisible primary is the way in which the special interest groups now control the 
nomination process.  Special interest groups, either alone or together, promote a 
candidate to the public in an effort for the candidate to win the nomination.  The 
nomination, though coming directly from the electorate, is implicitly driven by the 
special interest groups.   
 Instead of shifting the scope of conflict to the public as Schattschneider (1975) 
wanted, the changes in Congress have shifted the power among groups within the 
institution.  Institutional reforms sometimes spill over into the realm of voters.  The era of 




have effected, but were not instigated by, the electorate.  When Newt Gingrich was 
elected to the House, he almost immediately began to move the Republican Party in a 
more conservative direction.  Office-holders who served in the House with Gingrich were 
more likely to be more conservative than their party-mates and they are more likely to 
keep their seat in the Senate once they have achieved it.  Gingrich Senators are 
champions of partisan warrior mentality which exists in the Senate today.  On the 
Gingrich Senators, Theriault (2013) says, “Not only were their needs different, but the 
entire institution of the Senate was, indeed, different because of them” (p. 170).  Since 
Gingrich Senators came from the House, they developed different styles of legislation 
and working together within the system.  This translated to the Senate in a unique way, 
which helped lead the parties into polarization. 
 The Gingrich Senators are exemplary of strong parties who impact the way a 
party runs (Aldrich’s endogenous institution).  Party players are shaped by those running 
for office and party insiders who support candidates.  The party and the way it operates is 
changed by the people within the party.  Gingrich Senators also are a strong party unit 
which attempt to hold control over party members in Congress.  Along the lines of Cox 
and McCubbins (1993), when the Gingrich Senators have control, the party is 
homogenous, and the party is more successful in elections and in Congress.  When the 
Gingrich Senators became only a fraction of the Republican Party in the more recent 
elections, the party was heterogeneous, leading the party to do poorly in elections.  Now 
Gingrich Senators have been joined in their partisan warfare by the Tea Party.  These two 
groups have forced the Republican Party to the right, and further away from the 




Nothing’ Senate achieves the joint objectives of stalling liberal policy changes and of 
showcasing the Democratic majority’s incompetence” (Theriault, 2013, p. 173).  The 
partisan warfare of today’s Congress was driven by the Gingrich Senators and the 
Democrats’ response to their tactics.  The Senators had very specific policy interests 
which prompted a coalition of like-minded Republicans to internally change the workings 
of the Senate.  The intense policy demands are funneled through the legislators who work 
together to promote their particular interests within the Senate.  
 If Congress is now heavily partisan, what effect does this have on the electorate? 
In “Culture War?” Fiorina et al. (2010) make an early distinction between the political 
class and the public.  The political class consists of candidates, office-holders, political 
activists, interest group leaders, and political infotainers.  In opposition stands the public, 
who are generally less engaged than the political class.  Overall, the political class has 
much more at stake in the political arena which pushes their actions in a more extreme 
direction.  However, the public is also viewed generally as extreme.  Fiorina and his co-
authors want to discover why the electorate is seen as polarized and what the impacts of 
this are.  While their claim is not that the public is polarized, the polarization within 
Congress fuels the outcome of legislation and the ways in which parties operate. 
The informed political class is highly polarized, which leads to polarized 
candidates being placed before the public.  Fiorina et al. (2010) assert that “close 
elections may reflect equal numbers of voters who hate one candidate and love the other, 
voters who like or dislike both, voters who don’t care much at all about either candidate, 
or various combinations of these conditions” (p. 15).  When those in politics are highly 




representative of the political class who are highly involved in the political process.  
While party identification does indicate growing differences in the electorate, the authors 
attribute this to voters correctly identifying themselves now, whereas they incorrectly 
identified in the past (this is sorting).  Moderate voters also help in electing highly 
partisan candidates since there are few (or no) other choices.   
 According to these authors, “elites nominate the candidates and set the agenda, 
and voters respond” (Fiorina et al., 2010, p. 166).  Elites are the informed political 
class—this is where the culture war exists, not in the public.  To incorporate 
Schattschneider’s (1975) view that government should publicize conflict, the authors here 
say that the conflict has not reached the public.  It is only the elites involved in the 
conflict—the public is still on the outskirts.  The political class and extremists, the 
interest groups, are still in control of who runs for office and what happens in 
government.  Fiorina suggests one way to rectify this is to incorporate greater numbers of 
citizens to encourage more mainstream debates, instead of highly polarized special 
interest debates.  However, there are complications in mobilizing more of the electorate 
to participate in government.  Fiorina et al. offer no hard solutions, just a number of 
possibilities, such as increases in technology is potentially one way to incorporate more 
voters into the system.  As the public becomes increasingly disappointed with those in 
power an additional party is potentially a solution as well.   
 Coming full circle back to Schattschneider (1975), many of the reforms in recent 
years have been attempts at tipping the balance of power by engaging new people in the 
scope of the conflict.  Parties attract members through the conflict of focus at the time.  




exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization 
is the motivation of bias” (p. 69).  This means that each party focuses on the conflicts it 
handles well, the conflicts for which it has the most support.  Lack of voter participation 
is not due to indifference or ignorance.  It is a lack of avenue for the opinions or needs of 
those not participating.  Party organization is also a means for channeling the electorate 
into politics.  Reforms in Congress have been attempts at organization and electoral 
reforms have been attempts at publicizing conflict.  These two working together should 
have caused the electorate to have control over the outcomes of politics, but the outcomes 
are still largely controlled by the internal workings of parties. 
 Voting in Congress has become almost exclusively partisan on any salient issue of 
conflict.  This extreme partisanship does allow the electorate to assign blame to which 
party they believe is responsible for the passage of particular legislation.  Even those who 
are not immersed in the everyday goings-on of politics or Congress often see the results 
of major votes, which tend to be highly partisan.  Fiorina et al. (2010) discuss the 
polarization of Congress that has led to the partisanship of voting records.  This 
partisanship is a change of which Schattschneider (1975) would approve, but it has not 
had the impact Schattschneider would have expected.  With polarization and the ease of 
identifying responsibility in voting on legislation, the electorate, according to 
Schattschneider, should have gained control over the outcomes of Congress.  With 
obvious splits between the parties, special interests and intense policy demanders can 
coordinate around one when the other is displeasing.  However, there has been a constant 






 So, what happened?  Where did Schattschneider’s (1975) prediction fall short and 
what caused the discrepancy between his theory and reality?  The polarization of parties 
has not caused the electorate to band together in response to party politics.  The electorate 
is not consistent in electing one party wholly into government then wholly voting them 
out.  The electorate has also been unable to fully grasp control of parties, leaving intense 
policy demanders to battle for dominance within the parties.  This leaves the electorate 
with conflicting opinions about who actually is to blame.  Parties conflict both within 
Congress and in the general political sphere, including everything from local elections to 
opinions on current events.  This constant conflict is not compatible with the theory of 
responsible parties.  The public cannot always easily lay the blame on one party, which 
makes it easier for parties to continue conflicting with one another.  With the electorate 
still unsure of who to blame, the parties retain the power to make decisions in their own 
interests.  These interests are compromises between the special interests which comprise 
a party, adding complexity to determining responsibility.  It is not responsible parties as 
Schattschneider envisioned, but strong parties through which the electorate cannot see. 
 Chronological assessments of reforms and changes over time have been primarily 
restricted to institutional reforms or electoral reforms.  These reforms exist within the 
same system and influence both Congress and the electorate regardless of the type of 
reform.  Both Congress and the public are essentially tied to one another and cannot 
operate as mutually exclusive.  Analyzing these separately does not allow for adequate 




the electorate and electoral reforms impact the institution.  It is necessary to analyze these 
reforms in accordance with one another, not simply by themselves.   
 Intense policy demanders, interest groups, party insiders—these are essentially all 
the same group and stands in opposition to the public.  They are groups with private, 
particular interests that are attempting to wield party power in a manner that suits their 
purposes.  When reforms occur or the scope of conflict is publicized, intense policy 
demanders usurp any power that can be taken up by the general electorate and use it to 
manipulate the process so their own interests are met.  For example, after the McGovern-
Fraser reforms, the balance of power shifted.  Party insiders had previously worked 
through formal institutions, but post-reform insiders now use informal means for 
candidate promotion in accordance with their special interests (Cohen et al., 2012).  
Office-holders in Congress since the Newt Gingrich era have become less individual and 
more partisan, which has led to polarized parties that act in the interests of those who 
propel the party interests (Theriault, 2011).  As individuals become more partisan, the 
interests of the intense policy demanders in the party become more homogenous.  The 
shifting away from individuality toward partisanship drive the policy demands of the 
special interests which comprise the party structure.  This cycle of special interest 
domination followed by reform followed by special interest domination is preventing the 
electorate from having power over outcomes of Congress.   
 It is not important to pinpoint exactly where this cycle begins—it is only 
important that the cycle exists.  Intense policy demanders control the parties which are 
polarized in Congress.  The electorate is left following the will of polarized parties 




driven by special interests that have previous compromised to form a coalition.  The 
electorate splits into two sides since they are not given any other option or middle ground 
to occupy.  It is unclear what will break the cycle—reforms have consistently fallen back 
into the hands of intense policy demanders.  However, a voter-oriented system would 
allow the electorate to control the sway of parties, both as an institution and in the 
legislative process.  
 Parties are good for forming lasting coalitions around which voters can gather, but 
parties controlled by special interests are not helpful to the electorate.  With the 
implementation of the direct primary, the electorate should have gained control of inside 
party functions.  Nominating the candidate of their choosing would be a way for the 
electorate to control the outcome in government.  However, the party insiders simply 
reworked their methods and now bond together around a particular candidate to present 
as a favorite to the public during primary season.  Intense policy demanders depend on 
their control of candidate choice for promoting their interests in Congress.  The general 
electorate does not have all the same interests as particular groups and will not make all 
the same compromises with other groups.  Intense policy demanders ensure the candidate 
of their choosing wins the party nomination, even though voters are supposed to have 
control in primaries. 
 The ebb and flow of power within Congress has not fundamentally changed.  
Even when parties are not heavily dominant, they are still the guiding force behind what 
goes on in the legislature.  Whether there is a strong party leader or strong cohesion, the 
conflict is still inherently internalized within the party.  Party strength does determine the 




has not changed all that much.  Parties have consistently retained power over the 
outcomes of Congress.  It is party insiders who influence caucus members who push the 
nominees, making the nominees representative of the special interests who get them 
elected.  Office holders determine policy positions by the coalition of special interests 
upon which they depend for election.  Sometimes the coalition is strong and sometimes it 
is weak, but it is always a coalition of special interests, not public interests.  Without 
public interests taking the foreground in the legislature, the electorate would not have 
power over the outcomes.   
 It could be argued that special interest groups are representative of the most 
salient public interests, but this is not the case.  Intense policy demanders do not consider 
the public interest when making their demands.  Policy interests and party insiders are 
focused on an individualistic goal, even if there are different interests driving the goal.  
Having multiple goals or reasons for particular policies should not be confused with the 
public interest.  Each person has competing interests upon which to base policy decisions.  
Candidates are chosen by holding interests similar to the special interest groups within 
the party.  By having multiple interests, a candidate can appeal to the variety of intense 
policy demanders that are present within either party.  Since candidates are representative 
of the special interests, one party’s candidate necessarily stands in contrast to the other 
party’s.  Special interests come together and compromise to form a party, which means 
interests which stand in contrast to each other, are more likely to align with the opposite 
party.   
 Theriault (2013) defines Gingrich as an intense policy demander as well as an 




Republicans made more intense policy demands.  When an intense policy demander also 
happens to be a candidate, such as Gingrich, the parties are likely to polarize even further.  
The demands made on one side are nearly always matched by the other side.  By 
incorporating competing special interests, the parties set themselves up for conflict in the 
legislature.  Policies implemented under the Gingrich Senators were typically met by 
Democratic policies when they were in power.  Party power rises and falls over the 
course of time.  Intense policy demanders attempt to go as far as they can in their policy 
demands when they have power in Congress.  As Fiorina et al. (2010) found, most voters 
did not identify as polarized as the electorate, but polarized parties are what voters were 
given.   If parties were representative of the electorate’s interests, parties would not be as 
polarized.  Polarization occurs due to the intense policy demanders.  Reforms occur to 
diffuse polarization and it comes right back.  It is necessary to break the cycle of policy 
demanders and party insiders usurping the power in parties from the electorate. 
Conclusion 
 Congress has experienced reforms over time.  These reforms have been caused by 
a variety of things and have had a variety of impacts.  Elections have also experienced 
changes over time which have impacted the electorate.  The binding force behind all the 
reforms and outcomes, though, is the intense policy demanders who want to create 
certain effects in the legislature. While these also ebb and flow over time, they are always 
present in the election system.  Much of the literature has assessed either Congressional 
reforms or electoral reforms.  However, these two things must be considered together to 




 Chapters 2 and 3 use the Affordable Care Act as a case study through both 
institutional and electoral reforms.  The ACA is a conservative test because the issue high 
profile so the public was aware of it, it occurred recently, and was an important piece of 
legislation.  The electorate was aware that health care reform was a major topic for 
parties and candidates.  Chapter 2 looks at changes in elections and examines how 
reforms have been insufficient to take power away from special interests.  Reform of the 
primary system has led to the invisible primary, in which special interests promote a 
candidate of their liking to the electorate.  Chapter 3 looks at changes within Congress 
and how special interests and intense policy demanders use the party structure within 
Congress to achieve their goals.  Schattschneider (1975) thought that having strong, 






Chapter 2: Changes Outside 
 This chapter is looking at changes in elections.  Primary election reform in 
particular has been a source of special interests domination, despite attempts at handing 
power to the electorate.  By expanding the scope of conflict, the public should be able to 
hold parties responsible by ensuring that what the electorate wants is what the parties do.  
Reforms have been made outside of the institution of Congress in order to transfer power 
to the electorate.  The power the electorate was attempting to gain is the power to 
determine campaign and legislation outcomes.  This is an essential component of 
Schattschneider’s theory of expanding the scope of conflict.  Primary reform was the best 
attempt at allowing the electorate to hold parties accountable to their interests.  The direct 
primary deciding who would receive the nomination was an attempt to hold the party 
accountable to the electorate.  Instead, special interests have created the invisible primary 
by pushing their own interests before and during the primary to sway the electorate into 
voting for the special interest groups’ candidate.  The invisible primary is the process 
through which special interest groups promote a candidate to the public to ensure the 
candidate best for those special interests win the nomination.  This is done subtly so the 
electorate does not realize special interests are influencing their decision.  The electorate 
does not realize elites are leading the electorate through the invisible primary, allowing 
special interests to dominate through the primary seasons.   
 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a prominent piece of legislation about which 
the public was constantly flooded with information.  Special interests, including 
pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and insurance agencies, lobbied to and campaigned 




own interests.  The ACA should have been determined by the electorate—the electorate 
was aware of the bill and the bill began as publically oriented proposal yet special 
interests dominated the process. Since the electorate could not overcome special interest 
groups during this process, it shows that the electorate is largely powerless to determine 
what parties do.     
Electoral Reform 
 The notorious case of Hubert Humphrey’s nomination in 1968 spurred some 
critics to question the electoral system.  Humphrey won the nomination by appealing to 
insiders.  Insiders controlled the delegates enough to achieve their nomination even 
though voters never got the chance to vote for Humphrey in a primary.  Humphrey did 
not campaign to the electorate yet won the nomination by winning the support of party 
insiders who chose the candidate.  This caused a fundamental shift in the way candidates 
were nominated.  Direct primaries were the way for the electorate to control the candidate 
nomination.  The electorate was displeased when Humphrey won the nomination without 
having had to appeal to them, but won by relying instead on party insiders.  The primary 
election was established to allow the public to choose a candidate for themselves, instead 
of a candidate being chosen based on appealing to party insiders. Instead of the party 
deciding to whom the nomination goes, candidates now must go before the public to 
campaign for the nomination.   
 In 2008, the primary process and the campaign tour was a great way for the 
Democratic candidates to establish before the public the goals each candidate has for if 
they are elected.  Health care reform was among the top priorities of both candidates.  




gained insider support as the primary went on. During the primary season and throughout 
his campaign, Obama made overhaul of the health care system one of his main priorities.  
In early 2009, shortly after he took office, President Obama began the push to pass health 
care reform legislation (Cannan, 2013).  While his commitment to change made him 
popular with the electorate, and Clinton had a sizable initial lead in insider support, the 
endorsement of Democrats who were well-known and had been key players for former 
President Bill Clinton and former candidate John Edwards helped President Obama win 
the support of delegates, the crucial element to winning the Democratic nomination. 
Cohen et al. (2008) traces the history of intense policy demanders to the Founders 
through modern parties, demonstrating the need for appeal to insiders over the public.    
Even though the Founders were against parties, they acted like parties.  The Founders 
focused on policy, not the public.  The Founders were not concerned about having long 
careers, but about specific policies.  Particularly after papers became the popular way of 
presenting politics to the public, non-office seekers started trying to influence politics.  
Thus, parties were not driven by ambitious office-seekers/holders, but by policy 
demanders.  As stated earlier, Cohen et al. (2008) say that the primary reason for party 
formation is to achieve intense policy demands.  Parties formed around the Founders as 
a way to implement policies.  Interests are held together within the party system which 
allows for intense policy demanders to achieve policy goals, first and foremost.  The 
ambition of politicians is offered an avenue through the party, but this is only a 
secondary consideration.  The electoral interests of politicians is determined in part by 




Health care reform has made a few appearances in the past few Presidential 
cycles.  Former President Clinton made an attempt at health care reform, which failed.  
Several times in recent Congresses health care legislation has been discussed, but has 
never had much impact and nothing of significance has been introduced or passed.  
Although President Obama championed health care reform (the ACA is colloquially 
named Obamacare), its progress was pushed by lobbyists and party leaders, not the 
public.  The ACA passed on March 21, 2010.  Within a week, Gallup released a poll of 
Americans’ opinions.  Approval overall was right about half (49%), but was deeply split 
between parties.  Democrats approved by an overwhelming majority (79%) while an 
almost equally overwhelming majority of Republicans disapproved (76%).  In the same 
poll, Gallup compared the overall reactions to emotional reactions showing “50% 
enthusiastic or pleased versus 42% angry or disappointed” (Saad, 2010).  Overall ratings 
show approximately half of the nation as approving and emotionally positive toward the 
ACA in the immediate environment surrounding its passage and signing into law.  When 
asked about particular aspects of the bill, the electorate is even less enthused.  Only 39% 
approve of the individual mandate (Seman, 2014) and 18 % of those who disapprove do 
so specifically because of the individual mandate (DiJulio, Firth, & Brodie, 2015).  
Other than the individual mandate, most of the public remains ignorant of what is 
included or how it would affect them (DiJulio et al., 2015).  This was hailed as a victory 
for President Obama and the Democratic Party, even though public opinion was not 
positive and many Americans are unhappy with part, or all, of the ACA. 
According to Cohen et al. (2008) parties are controlled by intense policy 




by a demand/set of demands; (2) politically active on behalf of these demands; and (3) 
numerous enough to be influential (Cohen et al., 2008).  Interest groups like these 
attempt to influence every aspect of party politics they can.  This means that parties are 
simply a means to an end for policy demanders.  The electoral blind spot allows 
parties/groups/officeholders to make moves which voters would not necessarily approve, 
but the electorate does not notice.  Since the electorate has such a blind spot, elected 
officials become accountable to specials interest groups instead of the constituents.  
Interest groups within the party work together to promote a candidate who will represent 
the interests of each particular group.   
Lobbyists for pharmaceutical companies were hugely influential during the 
negotiation and implementation of the ACA.  When the ACA passed, polls showed 
higher levels of support than later.   Around the time of the ACA’s implementation 
Gallup found that, “Americans believe[d] the new legislation will make things worse 
rather than better for the U.S. as a whole, as well as for them personally, are consistent 
with previous Gallup polls” (Roberts, 2011).  If the public had been involved in the 
negotiation of the ACA, there should have been much greater approval of the bill than 
there was.  The public was in favor of health care reform generally, but was unaware of 
most of the details involved in the ACA.  Interest groups and Congressmen worked out 
the details amongst themselves, which explains why the electorate likes health care 
reform overall, but does not like the particulars.   
 Each party has to find a nominee who satisfies most or all the groups in the 
coalition.  There are two compromises made when selecting a candidate: (1) among 




of the party groups and the preferences of voters (Cohen et al, 2008).  A party is strong 
when it unifies around one strong candidate instead of allowing a candidate to overcome 
party insiders.  The invisible primary is the means for party insiders to promote their 
candidate to the public.  Although the electorate does vote on the nominated candidates, 
party insiders use the invisible primary to promote their candidate and ensure that 
candidate wins the primary election.  By utilizing the invisible primary, intense policy 
demanders can work within the party to comprise and choose the best candidate for their 
policy demands.  After settling internally, the candidate is promoted by party insiders 
during the primary election.  This leads the electorate into voting for the candidate chosen 
by the party insiders. 
 Party insiders choosing a candidate indicates the polarized position of insiders and 
special interests.  The electorate then chooses the candidate who has been promoted by 
these elites.  Although it has been widely accepted that polarization is occurring in 
Congress, there remains debate over polarization in the electorate.  Some literature finds 
that the electorate simply adopts the positions of elites (Zaller, 1992).  Some studies have 
found that elite discourse polarizes issues opinions in the electorate (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1989).  Schattschneider (1975) said that the incorporation of new issues or 
changing positions draws in new crowds.  The analysis of party platforms has shown that 
party leaders have polarized, particularly since 1980, and that platforms which used to 
focus on the median voter now focus on median partisans (Jordan, Webb, & Wood, 
2014).  Promotion of a candidate derives from party leaders and elites who want voters in 
the primary to support their candidate.  Whether or not the electorate is actually 




decision of voters when selecting candidates in the primary.  When party insiders and 
interests groups present a candidate during the primary, that candidate is a representation 
of the elites’ polarized opinions.  Instead of public conflict, party insiders want to keep 
from drawing in new crowds, but simply appease the crowds with the candidate of their 
own choosing.  
Just as intense policy demanders force their hand during the primary season, they 
also use their sway with major legislation.  Most polls show a nearly even number, or a 
majority, of Americans disapproving of the ACA.  Except that, when separated by party, 
most Democrats approve of the ACA and most Republicans disapprove of the ACA.  
Some public opinion experts were particularly concerned over the idea that the White 
House and the Democratic Party was so eager in their enthusiasm toward a 49% approval 
rate.  Anderson (2010) voices this concern saying it “further demonstrates [the White 
House’s] disconnect from the American people.”  One of Anderson’s main critiques of 
the Gallup poll’s results is due to the methods—Gallup surveyed random adults, not 
likely voters.  This makes a difference when compared to a poll conducted of likely 
voters. 
 In a poll of voters, there is a much different story than Gallup’s poll of American 
adults in general.  According to this poll conducted around the same time by CNN 
(Barbieri, 2010), 59% of Americans disapprove of the ACA, which is a 10-point different 
from the overall approval reported in the Gallup poll (Anderson, 2010).  The disapproval 
is whittled down to two primary reasons: 1) the belief that it will raise the deficit (70%); 
and 2) the belief that the overall cost of health would be raised (62%).  These ratings of 




CNN poll showed a much more negative view of the ACA and the potential impacts it 
would have on the nation.  These voters who are expressing such negative opinions are 
the people that parties should be listening to.  If parties were listening to the voters, there 
should not be such high rates of disapproval.  Given that the Gallup poll showed only 
49% approval and the CNN poll showed 59% disapproval, the White House has less 
reason to be pleased with the results than they were. 
 Surveying voters instead of all Americans is important because voters are most 
likely to be engaged and politically aware.  It is a grim picture when the approval rate is 
lower than the majority, but with a higher rate of disapproval in a poll of voters the 
picture looks worse.  Those who are most likely to be able to hold parties responsible 
have been unable to do so with the ACA.  Special interests have overridden the opinions 
of the electorate in general, and voters in particular have been displeased with the 
outcome.  Instead of the parties being held accountable to the opinions of those who elect 
them into office, the low approval rate demonstrates that parties are listening more to 
special interests than voters or the electorate.   
The Invisible Primary 
 Invisible primaries have replaced party convention bargaining.  Party insiders 
have to coordinate before and during the invisible primary.  A candidate might not be any 
group’s ideal choice, but might be acceptable to most or all of the groups within the 
party.  Parties want a candidate they can trust to uphold the special interests for their 
groups.  Cohen et al. (2008) find three actions occurring within the invisible primary: (1) 
A candidate alone cannot win the nomination, but has to have insider support; (2) 




of party insider; and (3) Factional candidates usually do not win party insider support.  
Since the McGovern-Fraser reforms, party insiders and special interests are the crucial 
aspects to a candidate winning a nomination.  However, party insiders will not get behind 
a candidate simply because the candidate is out in front in a primary.  The public often 
votes for whomever the party insiders favor and throw their support behind.  Winning 
insider support is the single most important factor for a candidate winning the party 
nomination.   
 The two candidates who received the nominations in 2008 both proposed health 
care reforms.  Then Senators John McCain and Barack Obama both responded to the 
electorate’s general sentiment that health care needed an overhaul.  According to one 
survey, “voters [were] calling for change: eight of 10 adults said in a May [of 2008] 
survey that the health care system is in need of a major overhaul or fundamental reform” 
(Collins, Davis, Nicholson, & Rustgi, 2008).  Health care was a very hot topic amidst the 
2008 campaign and election, and candidates appeared to be responding to the electorate, 
but interest group influence dominated the health care debate.  The candidates’ responses 
were tailored to what the electorate desired, but at the end of the day, the interest groups 
influenced the legislation process in favor of special interests without much regard to 
campaign promises.  Although both candidates were attempting to win a majority of 
votes in the election, the campaign promises had to be mindful of what party insiders 
wanted for health care reform, not of what the electorate wanted.   
 Party insiders select candidates that will appeal broadly to their groups.  Early 
support for a candidate comes from party leaders and insiders.  The invisible primary sets 




electorate is drawn to that candidate.  Endorsements are a good indication of the early 
national conversation.  When a candidate is endorsed by party insiders, it shows that there 
has been discussion regarding who the insiders want to receive the nomination.  This also 
prompts the electorate to consider candidates who have received endorsements as more 
viable choices.  Those giving the endorsement intend to support the candidate of their 
choice—not necessarily the candidate who would be best for the majority of the 
electorate.  Cohen et al. (2008) offer four measures of conversation between elites and the 
electorate: (1) endorsements; (2) media coverage; (3) fundraising; and (4) public opinion 
polls.  These measures provide various ways for party insiders to promote their candidate 
and see how the electorate is responding to the candidate.  Once a candidate has been 
endorsed, this impacts the media coverage and fundraising opportunities, which then 
impact the public opinion; “endorsements by party officials as reported in the media, 
cash-on-hand at the start of balloting, and Gallup standing at the end of the invisible 
primary affect overall results in the primaries and caucuses” (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 279).  
The invisible primary allows party insiders to promote their candidate to the electorate 
then influence the candidate’s chances at winning the nomination.  Candidates strive for 
the insider endorsements by promoting certain policy positions, which shapes the 
candidates platform during the primary season.  The initial endorsement in the invisible 
primary has the greatest impact on voters.   
 As voters follow the direction given by party insiders during the invisible 
primary, the electorate begins to look like the elites.  When a particular candidate is 
accepted by the electorate, that candidate becomes the representation of the electorate, 




Parties have also become more homogenous (conservative Republicans and liberal 
Democrats with little to nothing in between) which has led the electorate to follow the 
polarization trend (Garand, 2010).  The electorate is not as polarized as Congress, but 
they are portrayed as polarized.  The influence of party insiders in the invisible primary 
promotes a candidate with particular positions, which forces voters to elect candidates 
with whom the electorate would not necessarily align (Fiorina et al., 2010).  Polarization 
is a reflection of the intense policy demanders promoting a candidate in the invisible 
primary, making that candidate seem like the best and most viable option to the 
electorate.   
Primary Elections 
 The post-McGovern-Fraser reform primary process was established to give the 
electorate control over which candidate won the nomination.  Instead of the party 
deciding who won the nomination, primary elections were reformed so that the voters 
could choose between multiple candidates.  The McGovern-Fraser reforms were 
supposed to make the process more democratic.  Candidates engage in trade-offs during 
the primary process between: (1) capturing media attention; (2) delegate acquisition; and 
(3) eliminating rivals (Norrander, 1996).  Candidates have to decide which element of the 
primary process to focus on at various points over the primary season.  Between trying to 
secure both the electorate and party insiders, candidates split their focus between the 
media and other primary goals such as public speaking and fundraising. 
The primary was an attempt to publicize the conflict by allowing the public to 
control the nomination, rather than party insiders holding secret meetings to decide the 




allow the electorate to determine the best candidate who would then receive the official 
nomination and support of each party.  Momentum is gained in the primary season when 
early victories point a candidate toward winning the nomination and voters throw their 
support behind the candidate.  Norrander (1996) says primaries provide incomplete 
information and are based on interactions between engaged voters, activists, and elites.  
These interactions are what prompt early support for one candidate over another.  Starting 
in the invisible primary, party insiders promote their preferred candidate to other elites 
and activists.  The electorate picks up on this support, particularly through the media, and 
momentum is thrown behind one candidate (Norrander, 1996).  While candidates still 
have to woo the public, most of the work occurs through the assurance of party insider 
support.  Particularly delegate acquisition and the elimination of rivals is achieved when 
the electorate follows the support of the party insiders. 
 Most of the literature assumes primaries have a singular definition or method of 
implementation.  Since states are responsible for setting primary rules and regulations, 
there is great variety within the country.  Open primaries allow any registered voter to 
vote in a primary election.  Modified primaries allow a registered voter to choose in 
which primary to vote.  Closed primaries allow only registered party members to vote in 
the primary election.  States use different combinations of types of primaries, with no 
consensus or regulation from the federal level.  Closed primaries tend to be the most 
extreme, forcing candidates away from the median voter and toward the most extreme 
side of the party whereas the modified primary “may weaken party control over the 
nomination process, it…results in more moderate and more representative primary 




the possibility of victory for more moderate candidates.  Parties in different states have to 
accommodate the primary systems.  The various types of primaries clearly allows for 
varying influence of party insiders on the electorate.   
 How do Congressional candidates handle the different types of primaries? In an 
open primary, a candidate might be inclined to appeal to moderates or the general 
electorate, but very few (14) states hold open primaries. But in a closed or modified 
primary, a candidate is more inclined to appeal to party extremists.  It is not strategic for 
them to volley between the general electorate during the general election and the party 
extremes during the primary (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007).  Candidates face a decision at 
the beginning of the primary season, knowing that states will hold various types of 
primaries, whether to appeal to moderates and the general electorate or extremes.  
Candidates face this strategic dilemma in the primary season, and most choose to cater 
their campaign to the more extreme primary voters (Brady et al., 2007).  Primary voters 
as a whole tend to be more extreme than the general electorate.  Primary voters also 
follow the party insider preferences established in the invisible primary.  Taken together, 
this shows that the electorate has minimal control over the outcome of the nomination 
process.  Not only are party insiders attempting to determine the election from the onset, 
the candidates appeal to the more extreme section of loyal party voters.   
 Perhaps the most succinct description of the problem is this: “Party leaders seem 
to find clever ways of regaining control in spite of the reforms that were aimed at 
reducing their influence” (Kaufmann et al., 2003).  Electoral reforms were attempts at 
changing control from special interests to the public interests.  Instead of this happening, 




outcome of the election.  The McGovern-Fraser reforms simply changed the balance of 
power.  Party insiders used to work through formal institutions, but post-reform insiders 
now use informal means for supporting a candidate.   
Campaigns & Legislation 
How much was the ACA used during the last campaign?  How was the 
Republican Party impacted by a fully Democratic controlled Congress and Presidency?  
While the ACA passed during a Democratic controlled government, the 112th Congress 
saw a change to a Republican majority in the House.  Was this perhaps due to early signs 
of displeasure with the passage of the ACA?  The Republican Party gained large amounts 
of support in campaigns from health care interest groups who were unhappy with the 
passage, or certain parts of the content, of the ACA.   
 This section relies heavily on Gallup polls.  Gallup polls are widely used to 
establish the overall opinion of citizens on a variety of issues, particularly during political 
campaigns.  Over the past several years, Gallup, as well as others, has done much 
research on the ACA as a whole, as well as more minute aspects of health care and the 
approval the legislation and implementation.  By surveying the electorate, pollsters try to 
find an accurate representation of public opinion.   
 In 2013, Jose Delreal did a brief breakdown of polling to show more precisely 
who approved (or disapproved) of the ACA, plus how and why the approval rating 
fluctuates.  According to Delreal, one of the most apparent splits is down party lines.  
Seventy-five percent of Democrats approve of the ACA while approximately 30% of 
Republicans approve.  This wide split is highly reminiscent of what has come to be 




almost nothing in between.  The electorate, despite the fluctuations of opinion, remain 
split along party lines, showing the influence of party leaders to dictate the electorate’s 
opinions.  At the time of this survey in 2013, approval was approximately at 40%, 
meaning the majority of the nation did not approve of the ACA.  This came just after 
healthcare.gov first opened for registration.  While the utter dishevelment of the 
registration process was sure to cause some discontent, the approval rating did not change 
drastically.  The approval months before and just after the first attempt at registration was 
between ten percentage points, with a constant majority disapproving the legislation.   
 This poll of the electorate shows the electorate following closely with the 
opinions of Congressmen from each party—about two-thirds of Democrats approve and 
Republicans disapprove.  The low approval rating also suggests that the electorate might 
be more willing to choose candidates who were opposed to the ACA, which explains part 
of the shift to a Republican controlled House during the 112th Congress.  The Republican 
Party consciously reached out to voters based on the low approval of the ACA in order to 
get a greater number of Republicans elected in order to further the special interests in 
opposition to the ACA.  Who is leading whom is a difficult question, but the interest 
groups unhappy with the ACA had great incentive to back the Republican Party and get 
more Republicans in office.  Republicans, and the special interests that support them, 
convinced the electorate to vote in more Republicans, thus ousting enough Democrats to 
achieve a Republican controlled House.  Those special interests which sought changes to, 
or the complete repeal of, the ACA needed to get Republicans into office.  Republicans in 




next election cycle saw a spur of Republicans winning elections based on the dismay at 
the ACA.   
 One poll underscores the variety of opinion on the ACA, with some Americans 
saying it is President Obama’s greatest achievement and others saying it is his greatest 
failure. Democrats (and Democratic leaners) are highly likely to say Obamacare is his 
greatest achievement, while Republicans and Democrats are highly likely to say it is 
greatest failure (Newport, 2013).   Although it is mostly Democrats who say this is his 
biggest achievement, Democrats are about as likely as Republicans to say it is his greatest 
failure.  However, nearly as many respondents (23%) say nothing is his greatest 
achievement as healthcare being his greatest achievement (22%).  It is an even larger 
percentage of respondents who say this is his greatest failure (36%).  Based on this poll, 
more Americans believe this is a failure than a success.  How did the bill pass by such a 
majority in Congress when most Americans believe it is a failure?  The legacy of 
President Obama’s success, or failure, with healthcare cannot be fully determined yet.  
Just as other controversial issues were settled years after a President’s term, the ACA is 
relatively novel and its outcome cannot be fully decided.   
 The passage of a bill with such a large number of voters disapprove of 
demonstrates the lack of ability the electorate has in determining the outcome of 
legislation.  The public wanted health care reform, but special interests determined the 
details of the bill.  Reminiscent of the argument made by Cohen et al. (2008), the parties 
in Congress sought first to implement particular legislation.  The primary goal of many 
Democrats in Congress was to pass health care reform with as little compromise to the 




goal of defeating the ACA.  Republicans successfully convinced enough voters that the 
details of the bill are a problem.  The public initially wanted health care reform, but now 
are unhappy with the outcome of the ACA.  Interests groups led the electorate to the 
Republican Party as a way to reform the health care legislation passed by a Democratic 
Congress.  Ultimately, the Republicans in Congress have not yet succeed in repealing the 
ACA, even as its popular support declined.     
 Democrats and Republicans who cite the ACA as President Obama’s biggest 
failure cite different reasons for its failure.  In the same poll as when asked what 
President Obama’s greatest achievement and failure are, “Republicans cite Obama's lack 
of communication and lack of leadership as a failure, while Democrats mention his 
inability to get along with Congress and Republicans, his lack of communication, and 
lack of leadership” (Newport, 2013).  Newport suggests that with the ACA publically 
deemed Obamacare, the ultimate definition of his success or failure will depend on his 
ability to overcome what Americans deem failure and turn healthcare into an avenue of 
success. Again, the primary goal of Democratic Party was to pass this legislation, 
approved by most Congressmen within the Party.  Even though the Democrats lost the 
majority in the House in the subsequent election, the party goal of passing health care 
reform was the foremost concern.   
 Even though more Americans have insurance now than before the ACA, most 
Americans remain negative about the ACA overall.  Following the trend of the past, party 
affiliation is highly divisive for approval ratings, with “a vast majority of Democrats, 
79%, approve of the law, and 69% think it will make the healthcare situation better. In 




healthcare situation worse” (Jones, 2014).  Although more Americans receive benefits 
from the ACA, the public follows the opinions of party leaders.  The overall approval 
rating remains close to the disapproval rate, with 54% disapproving and 43% approving.  
With the increase of benefits as years go by since the ACA’s original implementation, 
approval rating has not changed much.  The ACA’s low approval rating stems from the 
lack of consideration during the drafting process.  With lobbyists and interest groups 
constantly making compromises with Congressmen, the electorate’s voice was edged out 
of the negotiations.  Democrats appear to be happier with the outcome of the legislation 
since it was passed during a Democratic controlled Congress, whereas Republicans have 
consistently disapproved of the ACA overall.  Regardless of the number of Americans 
insured, overall approval remains fairly low.  The Republicans and the special interest 
groups have convinced a majority of the electorate that the details of the ACA are a 
problem, which has led to the low approval rate despite the number of insured 
Americans.   
Conclusion 
The surveys taken by Gallup and others consistently show that Americans are 
unhappy with the ACA, Republicans more so than Democrats.  This is a reflection of the 
partisanship experienced during the drafting and passage of the ACA.  More than that, it 
is a reflection of interests groups controlling legislation through the parties.  Democrats 
controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency.  Instead of compromising 
between parties, Democrats compromised with lobbyists and interest groups.  This sort of 
compromise has led to many Americans frustrated with what is probably the most 




campaigns and priority of health care legislation should have been a prime opportunity 
for the electorate to exert their opinions and Congress to pass a piece of legislation of 
which the electorate would approve.  Instead, the electorate was flooded with coverage of 






Chapter 3: Changes Within 
Chapter 3 looks at the changes that have taken place within the institution of 
Congress.  Polarization in Congress and the changes in how parties work together (or not) 
inside of Congress.  The reforms in Congress have been attempts to incorporate the 
electorate, just as Schattschneider wanted.  Part of Schattschneider’s (1975) theory has 
come to pass—there have been multiple attempts at widening the scope of conflict to 
allow for greater participation of the electorate.  These reforms include the shift away 
from committee power toward party power, polarization of parties in Congress, and 
Congressmen expressing multiple interests.  Where they have failed is in the inability of 
the electorate to stop elite takeover.  This chapter looks at reforms made in Congress 
which could have allowed the electorate to control parties, but have failed to do so.    
These changes should have allowed for the electorate to determine what happens in 
government.  Unfortunately, intense policy demanders and interest groups continue to 
control the goings-on despite attempts to take away their power.  During elections and the 
legislation process, the electorate is denied power through the overwhelming influence of 
special interests.  One example of this is visible in the health care debate—an issue with 
which the public was extremely familiar and directly impacted.  The electorate should 
have been able to determine the outcome of health care reform, but was constantly edged 
out by lobbyists and special interest groups swaying legislators. 
Schattschneider (1975) believed stronger parties would publicize the scope of 
conflict.  Parties in America are now extremely polarized on almost every major issue.  
The parties hold opposing opinions which are well-known among the electorate.  This 




to hold parties accountable.  Instead, interest groups continue to drive party behavior.  
Even with responsible parties and issues the electorate is familiar with, special interests 
find their way to party leaders and members to determine how the party operates.   
Reforms in Congress  
There have been three major areas of change in Congress: (1) rules procedures 
and practices governing how matters reach the floor; (2) changes in the committee 
system; (3) changes in leadership instruments (Schickler, 2001).  Cohen et al. (2008) 
focused on the changes and reforms that have affected the public, the electorate.  The 
electorate has experienced the greatest change in the implementation of direct primaries.  
On the other hand, Schickler (2001) goes in-depth into the internal reforms and their 
impacts on Congress as an institution.  Of course, the reforms in Congress also have an 
impact on the electorate—what happens within Congress impacts the electorate’s views 
and votes. 
The first claim Schickler (2001) makes is that multiple collective interests 
typically shape each important change in Congressional institutions.  Many of the 
reforms studied showed actors working together among coalitions to implement 
institutional reforms which would benefit the whole coalition.  One example of this is the 
1970 Reorganization Act which was brought about by the cooperation between liberal 
Democrats and young Republicans.  The Reorganization Act was an attempt to overcome 
powerful committees in Congress and make internal workings more transparent to the 
public.  The passing of the Reorganization Act may seem an unlikely bond, due to the 
bipartisanship which would not happen now, but each sub-section of the party had 




the desire of specific groups to implement particular policies and make the electorate 
more aware.  Although legislators have and express a variety of interests, they now fall 
closely within party lines.  As committee chairs lost power, party leaders gained power 
which has led to the multiple interests becoming more polarized between strong parties.   
The advance of strong parties has led to legislators channeling their multiple 
interests through the party.  These multiple interests became quite apparent in the 
introduction of amendments to the ACA.  In the Senate, 506 amendments were proposed 
to the Senate’s original version of the ACA.  While not all of these were significant 
amendments, each one represents some facet of interest held by various Congressmen.  
The introduction and passage of amendments convolutes the process and makes 
following legislation harder.  Although Cannan (2013) argues that this number is 
misleading since many were insignificant, the amendments still represent the multiple 
interests in Congress.   Amendments were made in order to stall, change, and tinker with 
the ACA in accordance with the interests held by individual Congressmen.  Also, many 
of the lobbyists were former Congressmen or former staff members who took their talents 
dealing with Congress to the other side.  This revolving door of friends and former 
colleagues rallying support begs the question of whose interests are truly being 
represented with the ACA (Attkisson, 2009).  From advocating to lobbying, those 
familiar with the system tend to stay within it.  In the tightly woven infrastructure of 
office-holders and lobbyists, there is no place for the people’s voice.      
 In the case of the ACA it was a new member in the minority that shifted the 
mindset and plan of action for both parties in Congress, particularly in the Senate.  With 




Republican into his seat, the Democratic Party and Senator Reid in particular felt an acute 
need to get the ACA to pass more swiftly than before.  Iowa Republican Senator Chuck 
Grassley used his position in the Finance Committee to wield a modicum of the 
conservative view on the ACA (Schouten, 2009).  His position made him a target for 
lobbyists who wanted to reach out to the Republicans who were actively seeking 
bipartisan legislation.  While denying any unfounded influence, lobbyists donated heavily 
to Grassley, who ultimately voted against the ACA.  These concerns are among those 
which caused Majority Leader Reid to push the ACA through as quickly as possible, 
particularly after the Democrats lost the seat needed for an assured supermajority in the 
Senate. 
 Another claim made by Schickler (2001) is that Congressional institutions 
typically develop through an accumulation of innovations that are inspired by competing 
motives, which engenders a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting 
structures.  What this means is that it is easier to add to existing arrangements than to 
dismantle old structures.  This allows interested groups to achieve their goals without 
completely overturning the existing institutional structures.  Schickler (2001) says, 
“Institutions develop through superimposing new arrangements on top of preexisting 
structures designed to serve different purposes” (pp. 190-193).  Even (or perhaps 
especially) with aspects as complex as the budget, adding new parts to what already 
exists is easier to accomplish than cutting out entirely what already exists.  The addition 
of new things on top of the old also makes it more difficult for the electorate to 
distinguish the old from the new.  It is easier within the institution, but creates a dense 




 One of the most prominent aspects of persuasion within Congress is the high 
number of lobbyists who get involved in major pieces of legislation.  The complexity of a 
bill is only increased when a great number of Congressmen are influenced by a large 
variety of lobbyists.  Lobbyists were spending exorbitant amounts of money trying to get 
specific things added into the bill.  Pharmaceutical lobbyists spent millions trying to 
protect their industry’s business.  Toward the end lobbyists began focusing on small 
changes to the content instead of complete opposition.  “Big pieces of legislation 
typically require what one top lobbyist called ‘refinements or improvements or 
corrections,” which can be done at any point, right up to the last second (Yeager, 2013).  
Some legislators and lobbyists sought major changes and outright rejection of the bill, but 
the reality came in smaller changes to drafts maintaining a consistent them of an overhaul 
of the health care structure. 
 During the negotiations, the American Hospital Association (AHA) “spent more 
than $7 million dollars on its Washington lobbying campaign, ranked near the top 
spending in the industry” (AHA, 2015).  The association represents many hospitals 
during legislation processes and through health care reform.  The AHA also had “a team 
of 28 lobbyists and the AHA also makes significant contributions to members of 
Congress and congressional candidates” (AHA, 2015).  This is exactly the kind of 
influence which ousts the electorate’s voices.  The AHA is one of the many special 
interests which lobbied and donated during the drafting and negotiations of the ACA.  
These special interests were heard much louder than any opinion of the public’s.   
 The last claim Schickler (2001) makes is that the adoption of a series of changes 




promote competing interests.  When one group achieves enough power to promote solely 
their specific interest, such as with the role of the Speaker, there is often a backlash from 
those who oppose that specific interest.  This principle helps explain the constant rise and 
decline of power of the Speaker throughout the years.  An early example is Reed 
centralizing the Speaker’s power in the 1890s, only to have the power diminish when 
Henderson took office.  Then, with Cannon’s election in 1903, the Speakership gained 
much of its power back.  This constant flux of power in one position reflects the specific 
interests of various groups competing and getting what they want, one at a time, causing 
an ebb and flow in this position.  The position is dominated by individuals who are bound 
to the special interest groups who form the foundation of the party structure.  Not just 
with the Speaker, but with a small group of legislators who promote their special interests 
above all others is the ebb and flow of power is driven by the special interest groups who 
demand particular policies.  
 The addition of amendments and changes made make the content of the bill 
somewhat difficult for the electorate to follow.  The Senate made changes on the House 
original and the House made changes to the Senate variation of the ACA, which increases 
the difficulty of following and understanding the final bill.  Lobbyists attempting to 
attach last-minute changes to amendments were adamant in their efforts.  The health care 
industry is a major lobbyist sector and one of the heaviest donors in the nation.  The ACA 
was a prime lobbying opportunity for this group of special interests.  Advocacy and 
lobbying were prominent for years during and after the passage of the ACA.  Some of 
those who had originally worked within Congress to pass the bill eventually lobbied for 




draft the legislation are highly coveted for their knowledge and connection.  One such 
staffer “is Yvette Fontenot, who wrote key elements of the Affordable Care Act while a 
Senate staffer and then worked on the law at the White House and the Department of 
Health and Human Services” (Yeager, 2013).  Fontenot now advises a range of health 
care lobbying groups.  This is a deep-founded connection which exhibits no consideration 
of the electorate—only the health care industry.   
 All of these institutional changes only change the way in which Congress 
works—they did not impact the electorate directly.  At the end of the day, each 
Congressman does have the goal of getting elected which essentially depends upon the 
electorate.  Interest groups want particular policies and office-seekers want to win 
elections so they work together to achieve these goals.  Despite changes to the structure, 
both special interest groups and office-seekers find a way to work around the electorate 
and accomplish their goals.  However, candidates’ interests are greater than simply 
election or reelection.  The bulk of their multiple interests is policy-oriented, which the 
electorate is almost never directly involved in.  The problem is policy goals of office-
holders are intricately tied to the special interest groups represented by their party, and 
“the evidence from each period [of institutional change] provides strong support for the 
claim that multiple collective interests shape institutional change” (Theriault, 2003, p. 
249).  Multiple collective interests force compromise, but compromise among those in 
politics, not those outside the institution. 
Institutional Change 
In his article “The Case of the Vanishing Moderates,” Theriault (2003) discusses 




time, not simply from one Congress to the next.  One Congress to the next shows little 
change, but chronological assessments demonstrate much greater change.  By looking 
through changes over time, Theriault’s (2003) story helps show that despite reforms in 
the institutions, the electorate has not been able to grab hold of power.  One such change 
he discusses has been the increased usage of restrictive House rules.  Using restrictive 
rules in the House has made it more difficult for the minority party and moderates of both 
parties to influence legislation.  The majority party implements rules which do not allow 
for amendments or debate on a bill in the House or when it reaches the Senate.  However, 
Theriault (2003) makes it clear that restrictive House rules only explain some of the 
story. Restrictive rules are one way in which party powerhouses prevent anybody outside 
the majority or anybody who strays from House leaders from being able to influence 
legislation. 
These kinds of restrictive rules are often used in Congress, particularly with major 
legislation.  The ACA experienced restrictive rules in the form of limited debate time, 
used by the Democratic majority to limit the impact Republican members could have on 
changing, stalling, or stopping the bill.  Health care reform was one of President Obama’s 
primary goals upon election and he sought to start the process of change almost 
immediately.  President Obama offered vague guidelines and espoused broad goals for 
changing the health care system as a whole.  Health care reform legislation was referred 
to three committees in the House in early 2009, beginning the multifaceted process of 
creating a single piece of health care legislation which would pass both chambers, as well 




 Another change that has occurred is that there are now more ideological issues 
than in the 1960s and 1970s.  Which issues are salient to the public (and the issues being 
discussed within parties and the legislature) are more ideological than at almost any point 
in the past.  Government spending has been one of the largest areas of concern in recent 
Congresses.  This issue is one that is deeply divided down party lines, with Democrats 
and Republicans almost always at odds with each other with little overlap between 
parties.  The ACA became a highly ideological battle in Congress.  Democrats held both 
chambers and the Presidency, making passage possible, but Republicans still expressed 
their displeasure with the bill.  The parties were clearly divided on this issue, but the 
electorate was edged out of the negotiation process by special interests and elites.   
One of the most significant advantages in the Senate is having a filibuster-proof 
majority.  When the 111th Congress began, the Democrats held a super majority in the 
Senate, while maintaining a simple majority in the House.  This was an ideal time to 
introduce and pass legislation that would potentially not pass in a more evenly divided 
partisan circumstance.  The Democratic Party saw this as perhaps the only opportunity to 
implement the ACA with the smallest amount of compromise with the Republican Party 
who simply wanted to stop anything the Democratic Party proposed.  There was enough 
Democrats in the Senate to prevent a filibuster on the floor, and the Democrats could 
focus on achieving a majority vote in the House.  However, when a Republican won the 
Senate seat in the wake of Ted Kennedy’s death, the threat of a highly partisan, 
ideological war was close on the horizon.  
With the loss of the supermajority in the Senate, the Democratic Party had to 




Senate bill exactly as it was, so the Senate had to find a way to get the bill passed.  To 
pass the ACA, the Senate implemented reconciliation.  Reconciliation is a special 
procedure that is not often used.  Using reconciliation placed limits on the ACA: in the 
House, the bill was limited to the number of amendments that could be made; in the 
Senate, the bill had to be germane to the budget (Cannan, 2013).  These restrictive rules 
of reconciliation used by the Democratic Party solidified the fact that the ACA would not 
be bipartisan—using reconciliation takes away the power of the minority to negotiate 
with the majority.  Having drafted the legislation with White House insiders and 
Democratic leaders, the House bill passed, with slight revisions, in the Senate. It was then 
sent back to the House, which passed the Senate’s version.  The reconciliation process 
was used to bypass the Republican minority and bring together the Democratic majority 
in order to pass the ACA.  Democratic party leaders brought together their coalition to 
unify in the battle over health care reform.   
 Institutional changes have led to party leaders becoming explicitly ideological.  
Party leaders are upfront in their ideology instead of attempting to conceal or moderate 
their ideology.  Discussion and prominence of ideological issues has aided in the explicit 
ideology of party leaders.  New members of the legislature are elected with certain 
ideological tendencies.  Returning members of the legislature shift their ideologies 
toward party leaders. Returning members shift their ideologies largely due to the pressure 
to conform to party lines within Congress and to keep steady the party platform and 
image as a cohesive unit.  With an issue like the ACA, party leaders developed and 
espoused clear opinions either in favor or opposed to the passage of this health care 




shifting their positions, the divide between Republicans and Democrats on the ACA 
showed the deeply partisanship of the bill.   
The Gingrich Effect 
 Gingrich Senators are defined by Theriault (2013) as those who served in the 
House with Newt Gingrich then transferred to the Senate.  These Congressmen comprise 
a relatively extreme group of conservative Republicans.  They are so named for their 
history in the House, serving for a variety of time spans with Representative Newt 
Gingrich.  Gingrich was the key Representative responsible for shifting the Republican 
Party further to the right during his tenure in the House.  He motivated others in his party 
to shift to the right, further away from the Democratic Party.  The separation is how the 
electorate should be able to hold parties accountable.  The shift of the parties away from 
each other is indicative of responsible, strong parties.  Gingrich’s reign in the House 
instigated the move of the parties away from each other, resulting in a highly partisan 
Congress as former House members moved to the Senate.   
Theriault (2003) pinpoints the change in Congress from individual to partisan 
with the Gingrich Senators, saying, “The Gingrich Senators, almost single-handedly at 
first, propelled party polarization and escalated partisan warfare in the Senate” (p. 16).  It 
was with the highly partisan Gingrich Senators that others began to retaliate, solidifying 
the partisanship of Senators as a whole.  Gingrich Senators are more conservative than 
others in the Republican Party, which has solicited a more liberal stance from some in the 
Democratic Party.  As Gingrich and his cohorts attempted to push legislation to the right, 




led by Gephardt as they tried to rally against the Gingrich Senators.  Gingrich and 
Gephardt led the path of the parties diverging within Congress.  
 Gingrich got his beginning in the House, in the time when the Republican Party 
was seen as a permanent minority.  Republicans had been the minority for such a long 
time that Democratic majority was expected to continue indefinitely.  Republicans in the 
House worked with the Democrats to create bipartisan legislation—if the Republicans 
could not hold a majority, at least they were still able to influence policy.  Gingrich was 
not immediately a powerful player in the attempt to move to the right.  When Wright was 
elected Speaker, Gingrich went so far in his criticism he was practically standing alone.  
Then Gingrich became the Minority Whip (against the minority leader’s endorsement) 
and his formerly controversial tactics became a more common practice.  Wright stepped 
down, and in 1994, Gingrich became the Speaker.  This is where Gingrich gained a more 
conservative following. 
 When Gingrich Senators came to prominence in Congress, the Republican right 
became more extreme than the Democratic left and Gingrich Senators were further from 
other Republicans than Gephardt Senators were from other Democrats.  Theriault (2013) 
traces the partisan move almost entirely back to Gingrich and his influence over fellow 
Republicans in the House, who eventually transferred to the Senate.  Other institutional 
changes impacted Congress as well, but the Gingrich effect is the single most influential 
factor in the polarization of parties within Congress.  The pack mentality was higher 
among Gingrich Senators which led Republicans to have a much more partisan, and 
conservative, voting record.  Democrats did not exhibit such partisan behavior or liberal 




Theriault (2013), the Gingrich effect (Republican Senators voting with extreme 
partisanship and conservativism), does not fade over a Senator’s career, and is strongly 
affected by when individual Senators were first elected to the House.  Entrance to the 
House matters more than transfer to the Senate.  The Gingrich effect impacted members 
who transferred from House to Senate so significantly that it caused a partisan shift 
across all of Congress.  The partisan shift caused responsible parties, but did not increase 
public influence.  The strong parties, according to Schattschneider (1975), should have 
taken power away from interest groups and given it to the public.   
 Since the first Gingrich Senator went from the House to the Senate, more of the 
Republican Party and Republican leadership has held Gingrich Senators.  The Gingrich 
Era made individuals more likely to try for a seat in the Senate and more likely to keep 
their seat once in the Senate.  Representatives moved in greater numbers to the Senate 
and some of these Representatives-turned-Senators became part of the Republican 
leadership.  The Gingrich Senator effect cannot be explained simply by House members 
running for Senate positions in this era.  Theriault says the Gingrich Era turned Downs’ 
theory on its head (Theriault, 2003).  Downs’ theory of the Median Voter suggests that 
each party converges on the median voter in order to win the support of a majority of 
voters. Parties shift their stances based on the median of voters’ stances. The graphic 





Figure 1. Downs’ Median Voter Theorum 
[Mackenzie.  The University of Delaware. Public Choice and Government Failure.  
http://www.udel.edu/johnmack/frec406/govt_failure.html] 
 
Instead of converging upon the median voter, Republicans running for Senate won seats 
at higher rates by being more extreme in their opinions.  Gingrich Senators: (1) raise 
more campaign funds than other Republicans; (2) are more electorally secure; (3) are 
more likely to change the Senate than be changed by the Senate (Theriault, 2003).  
Although the electorate did not share the immensely conservative opinions, Republicans 
won, and kept, seats by being extremely partisan.  Gingrich Senators won elections 
because they were supported by interest groups and activists—not the electorate.   
 Gingrich Senators are also the reason behind confrontational partisanship and 
stalemate.  Gingrich Senators, far more than other Republicans, lead the way against 
nominations and policy presented by Democrats.  They used filibustering as a means to 
stop the Democrat majority from passing legislation.  Whereas House members prior to 
the Gingrich era would work with the Democrats to create bipartisan legislation, Senate 
members during and after the Gingrich era worked against Democrats to stop unwanted 
legislation.  Gingrich Senators are also less likely to cosponsor Democratic bills and more 




Democrats and Republicans with Republicans being the most obvious partisan warriors.  
The obvious split between partisans was only increased during the 2010 election which 
say the election of many Tea Party candidates.  Tea Party members were even more 
distant from other Republicans than Gingrich Senators, which served to increase the 
distinction between Democrats and Republicans.  Through the election of Gingrich 
Senators and Tea Party members, “the entire institution of the Senate was, indeed, 
different because of them” (Theriault, 2003, p. 170).  Both groups of Senators actively 
sought to promote extremely conservative policies while blocking anything brought forth 
by the Democrats.  The House was influenced as well, but tends to be more polarized in 
general.  The Senate in particular experienced major changes in operations due to the 
increased polarization of the parties within the institution.  The Gingrich effect of moving 
parties away from each other led to the polarization which was needed for the electorate 
to gain power from the special interests which dominated in the era of strong committees.  
When there is obvious differences, parties should be accountable to the public, but even 
after the Gingrich effect moved parties away from each other, the public was not able to 
hold parties accountable.   
 During the House’s and the Senate’s instigation and consideration of health care 
reform, the bitter rivalry between parties, which was an asset to Republicans while they 
were the majority, became a great asset to the Democratic majority.  With only a minority 
in both chambers of Congress, the Republicans could not do much to halt the passage of 
the ACA.   It did not, however, stop them from vocalizing their opinions against the bill 
or the impact they believed it would have on Americans.  In the House, minority views 




Reid worked behind closed doors with party leaders and White House insiders to create a 
plan that was best for the party and the President.  However, the Senate does not allow 
for such easy domination by the majority as the House.  In the Senate, it required a 
supermajority to limit the hours of debate and number of amendments.  These restrictions 
on the minority coupled with the changes in Congress during recent years, created a 
turbulent atmosphere in which the ACA had to operate.   
After Passage 
 The healthcare bill was a hugely partisan endeavor of the most recent Congresses.  
The Affordable Care Act was signed into law by President Obama in 2010.  The bill was 
sponsored by a Democrat and co-sponsored by 40 Democrats and 3 Republicans.  The 
fact that there is an overwhelming number of Democrats co-sponsoring the bill gives 
some indication of the difficulty of Republicans’ ability to achieve any sort of bipartisan 
compromise.  For the first two years of the President’s term, Congress was majority 
Democratic.    The ACA is colloquially named Obamacare, and is generally viewed as 
the brainchild of President Obama.  It was originally passed in the House in October of 
2009, about a month after its introduction.  It passed the Senate with changes in 
December of 2009.  The bill bounced between the House and the Senate in several 
different forms before one all-inclusive bill could be decided upon.  From introduction in 
the House to signage by the President, the process took a year and a half, passing just a 
few months before Republicans would gain majority in the House.   
 Although the bill passed in 2010, its implementation was delayed until 2011.  The 
reason for this was not some concern brought forth by constituents as the individual 




the mandate to provide coverage for employees (Yeager, 2013).  This did not, however, 
open up debate about the actual content of the ACA, but merely shifted the time 
constraint to allow business longer to meet the legislation’s standards.  Some companies 
did ask for a repeal, but most seeking it understood that repeal or upheaval would not 
occur in the existing political environment.  Perhaps it was necessary courtesy to allow 
businesses an extra year before enforcing the ACA, but the question remains whether or 
not businesses were buying time and lawmakers agreed, despite electorate needs. 
 In 2013, advocates predicted that implementation would take multiple years.  
Scott DeFife predicted three to seven years for some businesses to be able to fully 
integrate the new standards into their employees’ health care packages saying, “People 
understand that some of these very detailed elements in the law may not jibe” (Yeager, 
2013).  Again, it is understandable to need time to adjust to legislation that has such a 
large impact on businesses and employees, but taking seven years to fully implement the 
legislation could create struggles for individuals and delegitimizes any incentive to 
implement the measures immediately.  By extending the timeline of implementation, the 
government is extending favor to businesses and lobbyists over the constituents they are 
bound to serve.   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, reforms have been attempted both within the institution and with 
the electorate to allow the public control over government.  The attempts at expanding 
the scope of conflict, as Schattschneider (1975) wanted, have not led to the electorate 
being able to hold parties accountable.  Schattschneider thought that responsible parties 




distinct parties, special interests continue to dominate what parties do.  Instead, the 
reforms have continued to allow special interests and intense policy demanders to 
determine the action of parties.  Health care reform was started for the public, but the 
ACA was drafted in accordance to the wishes of special interests—not the electorate.  
This legislation demonstrates that the electorate is kept blind to what the parties are doing 
in Congress.  Special interests continue to dominate party governance, while the 
electorate plays along through the primary season without actually being in control of 
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